I paid 99 cents by Apple Pay to see the result of an online IQ test. Shortly afterward, the same merchant debited €39.99 from my card. I saw no second payment sheet and no Face ID prompt.
I spent years in fraud and product risk at Visa Europe, and later covered fraud detection as an analyst. I am not the obvious target, and if someone with that background can be caught, the pattern clearly does not rely on stolen credentials or a careless victim; it relies on a gap between what a wallet authenticates and what a merchant can charge afterward.
This post explains how the gap works, why banks struggle to classify the result, and what wallets, card schemes, and regulators could do to close it.
A Small Payment That Opens a Larger One
The sequence is consistent across hundreds of consumer reports. A site offers a quiz, a test, or a report. At the end, it asks for a payment of around one euro to release the result. A larger debit follows within days, sometimes within minutes.
IQ tests are the most visible vehicle, and Apple Pay appears in many of the accounts:
- One Apple Support Community user paid 70 cents and lost $44.99 a week later.
- Another paid $1.98 and then saw a $28.80 charge.
- A third paid €0.50 and was debited €39.90 two days later.
- A BBB Scam Tracker entry describes $1 to $2 fees followed by charges of $30 to $60.
The pattern is not limited to IQ tests. Which? has reported on personality tests with hidden pricing, and EU consumer authorities list low-cost trials with recurring payments in the small print as a frequent online trap.
Several victims say they chose Apple Pay because it felt safer than typing a card number into an unfamiliar site. That instinct is reasonable, since the wallet does protect the card number, but it does nothing to limit what the merchant charges next.
The Wallet Authenticates a Payment, Not an Agreement
The biometric approval in a wallet covers one thing: the amount on the payment sheet, payable to the named merchant. The agreement that permits later charges sits somewhere else, usually in small text on the merchant's web page.
Apple does provide a better path. Its merchant token model lets a merchant show billing terms for a subscription inside the payment sheet. The merchant has to ask for it, though. A payment request must include a recurring configuration to receive a merchant token. A plain request shows a one-off amount and returns a device token.
In practice, the device token from that one-off request can be used again: payment processors document how a merchant can save the device-token-based payment method and charge it again later. Those later charges are merchant-initiated transactions (MITs), and the customer is not present for them.
European rules draw the same line between the first payment and the charges that follow:
- Strong customer authentication (SCA) produces a code that is specific to the amount and the payee.
- Payee-initiated transactions are not subject to SCA.
- The mandate behind them should be set up with SCA when given remotely.
In this pattern, the authentication binds to one euro. The mandate terms, including the larger amount and its frequency, are never shown by the wallet. The consumer authenticates the payment, and the merchant claims the authentication also covered the agreement.
The cryptography worked as designed; what failed was consent, which is why I describe this as a consent gap.
Fraud or Dispute? The Label Decides the Refund
The consumer's outcome depends on how the bank classifies the second charge. If it is unauthorized, the bank owes a refund. If it is an authorized payment under a disputed contract, the consumer is sent back to the merchant.
Wallet authentication can work against the victim here. One Apple Pay user reported that their bank declined to dispute a €33.99 charge because a wallet payment counts as confirmed by the user. The bank treated authentication of a one-euro payment as evidence of consent to a later, larger one.
Consumer bodies read it differently. Which? advises that payments under a subscription that was not properly disclosed would likely be considered unauthorized and should be refunded in full.
European law offers a middle route. The second Payment Services Directive (PSD2) gives payers an eight-week refund right for merchant-initiated transactions, but only where the original authorization did not specify the exact amount and the charge exceeds what the payer could reasonably have expected, and the bank can still refuse it.
Regulators considered a stronger fix and stepped back from it:
- The European Commission's 2023 draft of the Payment Services Regulation (PSR) proposed a no-questions-asked refund for every MIT within eight weeks.
- Merchant and payment associations argued that this would invite refund abuse on digital goods.
- The agreed compromise text, approved in committee in May 2026, keeps the unconditional refund for direct debits only.
The industry objection has merit, because most subscription billing is legitimate. The result still leaves this pattern where it was: the consumer must prove a negative to a bank that sees a valid token and a valid authentication.
Four Places to Close the Gap
The rules needed to stop this mostly exist. Visa has required express, informed consent for trial offers that convert to subscriptions since April 2020, for digital as well as physical goods. Mastercard requires disclosure at the point of payment for low-cost digital trials. The pattern persists because no control point enforces those rules at the moment of consent.
Each party in the chain can change that:
- Wallet providers: bind the mandate to the authentication. If a merchant intends to charge again, the payment sheet should show the later amount and frequency, and a one-off sheet should yield a credential that cannot be reused for MITs. Wallets should also list every stored merchant credential and let the user revoke it.
- Issuers: treat a very small customer-initiated payment followed by a much larger MIT from the same merchant as a risk signal. Stop accepting wallet authentication of the first payment as proof of consent to the second. Revoke the token when a customer disputes. Our Buyer's Compass on Fraud Reduction Intelligence Platforms for finance sets out the detection capabilities to look for.
- Schemes and acquirers: monitor merchants whose ratio of small first payments to larger follow-on charges, and whose dispute rates, fit this profile, and apply the existing negative-option rules to them.
- Regulators: require that the amount and frequency of an MIT mandate are part of what the payer authenticates, not text beside it.
The first of these would have the largest effect. Wallets already hold the user's trust and control the user interface. Today the informative recurring sheet is an option the merchant can decline, and the merchants in this pattern have a clear incentive to decline it.
Authentication Is Not Consent
Three points matter for anyone who designs or operates payment controls:
- A wallet proves who approved a payment and for how much. It does not prove what else the payer agreed to.
- Tokens protect the card number. They do not limit a merchant's later charges.
- Dispute handling that equates authentication with consent leaves the consumer carrying the loss.
A recent KuppingerCole blog makes a related case for national eID schemes: a valid approval no longer proves intent. We have followed SCA since the PSD2 drafts, including what done right looks like. If you are reviewing fraud and dispute controls ahead of the PSR, talk to our experts.